China’s warships gift and funding naval base in Cambodia: Could it put regional dynamics in choppy waters?

SINGAPORE: As a Chinese-funded upgrade of a naval base in Cambodia inches closer to completion, recent confirmation that Beijing will gift two warships to Phnom Penh has stirred further suspense and questions over China’s intent, and the role it wants to play in the region.
Analysts say the overhaul of Ream Naval Base – situated off the Gulf of Thailand in Cambodia’s southwestern Sihanoukville province – would benefit Beijing more as Phnom Penh lacks the military means to fully utilise the enhanced facilities.
The twin moves could be part of a deal to secure China preferential rights to use the military installation, said Dr Abdul Rahman Yaacob, research fellow in the Southeast Asia Programme at the Lowy Institute.
“The provision of military assistance to Cambodia is a means to an end for China, aimed at influencing Phnom Penh to serve Beijing’s long-term interests,” he told CNA.
Observers say the manoeuvres fall into a wider push by China to carve out a larger regional foothold as it competes for influence with its strategic rival the United States. At the same time, they’re questioning claims made in some news reports – that Beijing’s actions are tightly linked to its South China Sea and Taiwan agendas. 
Experts CNA spoke to are also split on how Beijing’s actions will affect regional dynamics. Some warn that the developments could raise the temperature in Southeast Asia, particularly among Cambodia’s neighbours, while others are sceptical.
“Thailand, Vietnam and to some extent, the Philippines ought to be alarmed over the increase of (Chinese) military activity in the Gulf of Thailand, given the overlapping territorial claims there and in the South China Sea … tensions could rise as a result (and) that’s something the Cambodian leadership needs to be aware of,” said Dr Abdul Rahman.
However, Dr Chang Ching, a research fellow at the Taipei-based Society for Strategic Studies, argues that it’s not unusual for a smaller country like Cambodia to seek military assistance from a larger nation.
“Compared to Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam possess far more advanced and well-developed military capabilities. For instance, Thailand has its own aircraft carrier. Cambodia simply needs to modernise its military, and its neighbours are aware of that,” he told CNA.
Reports first emerged in late August that China would gift two warships to Cambodia. Confirmation by Cambodia’s defence ministry came a week later, identifying the vessels as Type 056 corvettes. 
Developed by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, this vessel class is designed for littoral combat, as described on China’s defence ministry website. Operators include the PLA Navy, China Coast Guard, and the Bangladesh and Nigeria navies.
Such vessels are capable of executing a range of missions, including patrol, escort, search-and-rescue and surveillance, according to Chinese defence news portals. They are equipped for electronic and anti-surface warfare and also possess anti-aircraft and anti-submarine capabilities, the reports state.
Seventy Type 056 corvettes were built across four Chinese shipyards between 2011 and 2019, according to Naval Technology, an online site specialising in naval defence news.
A Cambodian defence ministry spokesperson said they were being provided in response to Cambodia’s request for Chinese support and could be delivered as early as next year. 
“(The acquisition is) part of efforts to strengthen Cambodia’s capacity to maintain regional peace, security, and humanitarian operations, including search and rescue missions,” the spokesperson asserted.
Observers have drawn links between this gifting of warships and Ream Naval Base.
They point out that two vessels of the same variant have persistently docked there since December 2023, soon after a new pier at the base became operational.
Satellite imagery analysis by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in the United States backs this up. In an April report, AMTI said the two People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy vessels have been the only ships to have docked at the new pier.
The vessels spent 93 per cent of their time at the facility – 85 out of 91 days – based on clear satellite imagery. The pier was vacant only during two brief periods, from Jan 15 to Jan 18 and Mar 29 to Mar 30, the report noted.
The connection to Ream has thrust the naval base back into the spotlight. It previously courted controversy after reports alleged a secret agreement granting China a permanent military presence there, as well as claims Beijing would have exclusive use of the facilities.
China and Cambodia have repeatedly denied the allegations.
China is reportedly fully funding the overhaul of Cambodia’s Ream naval base, according to multiple news reports. A Nikkei Asia report in October 2020 noted that plans for the upgrade had been previously disclosed by the China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC Group), a state-owned enterprise.
In a now-removed statement that was seen by the news outlet, MCC Group announced in June 2016 that it had signed a “cooperation framework agreement” with Cambodia’s defence authorities for a “port expansion project”.
Scrutiny fell on Ream Naval Base in southern Cambodia in 2019, when the Wall Street Journal reported that Cambodia had signed a secret agreement allowing China’s military to use the base for 30 years, citing unnamed US officials.
The report prompted strong denials from both Phnom Penh and Beijing. Then Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen called the report “the worst fake news against Cambodia” and stressed that such a deal could not have happened as “hosting foreign military bases is against the constitution of Cambodia”.
Cambodia’s constitution explicitly forbids foreign military bases in its territory.
A Chinese defence ministry spokesperson also dismissed the Wall Street Journal report as “fabricated”, asserting that China and Cambodia only cooperate on military training and logistical support, and the bilateral partnership “does not target any third country”.
In June 2022, The Washington Post reported that China was in the midst of building a secret naval facility in Cambodia “for the exclusive use of its military”, referring to Ream.
Citing unnamed Western sources, the report alleged that the naval port would serve as “(China’s) second overseas military installation after a base in Djibouti” and both Beijing and Phnom Penh were taking “extraordinary measures” to conceal the operation.
In response to the report, a Chinese official denied that the Ream naval base was intended for “exclusive” military use, stating that other personnel, such as scientists and researchers, would also utilise the facility.
This was echoed by Cambodian authorities.
“There is no agreement or law stating that the construction is reserved solely for Chinese benefit,” said a government spokesperson, adding that the base would remain open for visits from other countries, “including the United States”.
The practice of allowing foreign navies access to local naval bases is not uncommon among Southeast Asian countries, noted Dr Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute. He cited Vietnam’s agreement with the Soviet Union, later continued by Russia, to use military facilities at Cam Ranh Bay from 1979 to 2002 as a key example.
Another notable example is Singapore’s Changi Naval Base, which underwent significant upgrades in the 1990s to accommodate large vessels, including aircraft carriers.
This development followed the signing of an addendum to the 1990 United States–Singapore Memorandum of Understanding, which formalised arrangements for US Navy ships to utilise Changi’s facilities. In addition to hosting US vessels, the base has also welcomed ships from the Chinese navy.
“So, while the Cambodian government asserts that it has not entered into any defence pact with China, it may seek to follow the model of Changi Naval Base. They reason: ‘If Singapore can do it, why can’t we?’ I believe there is certainly validity to that question,” Dr Abdul Rahman said.
 
In the case of the two Chinese warships being berthed at Ream, Cambodian authorities in May justified their presence as helping to train the Cambodian navy and prepare for the annual Golden Dragon military exercise, which took place across 15 days that month.
A total of 1,315 military personnel from Cambodia and 760 from China participated in the bilateral exercise this year. The drills focused on counter-terrorism and humanitarian relief.
Cambodian defence ministry spokesperson General Chhum Sucheat also rejected allegations that the Chinese navy had been using facilities at Ream as a military base.
The extended training programme emphasises “technical skills in the operation of ships, weapons, and other new technologies”, he said, noting that the Chinese side was also assessing the quality of the upgraded Ream Naval Base, which it helped develop.
Cambodia is also planning to purchase additional warships similar to those currently docked at the base, the general added, without providing specifics.
According to a Radio Free Asia (RFA) report on Aug 27, referencing satellite images, the new pier at Ream “mirrors the Chinese naval base in Djibouti” and is estimated to be approximately 300 metres in length. China’s sole overseas military base in Djibouti, on the coast of the Horn of Africa, was established in 2017.
Located at the strategic entrance to the Red Sea corridor opposite Yemen, Djibouti is also home to military bases from a raft of nations like the US, Germany, Spain, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Saudi Arabia.
Beijing asserts that its naval base there will serve as a resupply point for navy ships involved in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, particularly off the coasts of Yemen and Somalia.
While the exact number of PLA personnel stationed at China’s Djibouti installation remains unclear, observers estimate that the tally does not exceed 2,000.
The report indicated that Ream “has undergone rapid expansion and extensive upgrades over the past year”. Media observations on-site revealed that in addition to the new pier, the base also has a dry dock, a wharf, and several large buildings, including offices and barracks.
According to the RFA report, control of the China-funded facilities is set to be handed over to Cambodia imminently.
Analysts say the upgrades to Ream Naval Base are in China’s favour more so than Cambodia’s, pointing out that Phnom Penh lacks the military wherewithal to put them to full use.
“A base of (such) length and scale would likely be able to handle any ship in the Chinese navy’s fleet,” Professor Zachary Abuza from the National War College in Washington DC told CNA.
“(But these facilities) far exceed Cambodia’s own capabilities and needs, (and that) raises considerable questions,” he added, noting that Cambodia’s navy has remained basic and barely has any naval vessels over 50 metres in length due to a “lack of investment” in modernisation.
“(Cambodia) would not possess the expertise to operate complex warships or advanced radar and communications systems.”
Prof Abuza believes even though both China and Cambodia have denied any formal agreement granting the PLA Navy exclusive use of Ream Naval Base, it is likely that Beijing has “privileged access”. 
This would allow it to make port calls and potentially station “substantial military personnel” in advisory roles to Cambodian forces, he said.
“China is giving two vessels that Cambodia lacks the expertise to operate … (Cambodia’s personnel) are not trained for these types of ships, from handling navigation to managing the weapons systems.
“This situation provides China with a rationale for maintaining a near-permanent presence in Cambodia for training exercises,” he said.
Observers CNA spoke to believe that China’s involvement in funding the Ream naval base and providing military assistance to Cambodia is not tied to any one specific strategic aim – but rather, forms a broader approach to expanding global influence and strengthening bilateral ties.
Western observers and media have raised concerns that the Ream naval base could play a role in Beijing’s broader strategy to establish an overseas network of military facilities in support of its superpower ambitions.
Some have linked the base to China’s so-called “string of pearls” strategy, a geopolitical concept first proposed by US political researchers in 2004.
The term describes China’s efforts to develop a chain of military and commercial outposts along key maritime routes, stretching from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan in the Horn of Africa, aimed at securing vital sea lines of communication and expanding its strategic influence across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. 
Some analysts have said that China’s establishment of its overseas military base in Djibouti is part of this strategy. Meanwhile, Beijing has downplayed its importance, characterising the base as a “logistical facility” and asserting that it will not interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. It has also emphasised that its operations will be conducted solely under a United Nations (UN) mandate or with UN approval.
Analysts whom CNA spoke to questioned the assertions made by foreign news outlets and analysts regarding Beijing’s actions at the Ream naval base.
Dr Chang from the Society for Strategic Studies in Taipei, dismissed as “ludicrous” claims that the Chinese military would use the Ream naval base in Cambodia as part of its contingency plans during a conflict with Taiwan.
Some Western observers have suggested that China’s presence at Ream may be part of a long-term contingency plan in the event of a conflict with Taiwan, the self-ruled island that Beijing considers a breakaway province.
For instance, Mr Craig Singleton, senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies think tank in Washington DC, told the Wall Street Journal in July: “China’s goal is to impede US forces from safely transiting through the Malacca Strait to China’s periphery, in effect keeping them out of the fight.”
But the base is too far from Taiwan, and China has “far more superior options” in the East Sea and South China Sea, Dr Chang told CNA. 
Some experts whom CNA spoke to also questioned the effectiveness of China advancing its interests in the South China Sea through growing its presence at Ream.
Germany’s state-owned news outlet Deutsche Welle, in a May 28 report, quoted observers suggesting that recent military cooperation between China and Cambodia “will allow Beijing to use Cambodia as a conduit to advance its strategic interests in the South China Sea”.
Beijing claims almost all of the South China Sea as embodied in its so-called nine-dash line, although it has never precisely defined what it means. This assertion is at odds with the maritime claims of several Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.
Dr Abdul Rahman from the Lowy Institute notes that from a military and tactical perspective, it would not be practical for China to operate from Ream to maintain a presence in regional waterways like the South China Sea or the Strait of Malacca.
“(China) already operates several military bases in the South China Sea, most of them built on artificial islands. These bases, serving as regional launchpads, would play a far more significant role than the Ream naval base,” he said.
“Moreover, the Ream naval base is just 30 kilometres from a cluster of Vietnamese military facilities. It wouldn’t make sense for China to conduct tactical operations there, as it risks compromising sensitive information or allowing the Vietnamese to interdict or block its vessels.”
China’s broader aim in establishing a military presence using the base in Ream is to prevent the formation of a unified regional front against its territorial claims in the South China Sea, according to Dr Abuza from the National War College.
“China’s presence there allows it to focus on Vietnam, which has overlapping claims with Beijing in the disputed waters,” he explained. “Additionally, it reinforces China’s dominance over Cambodia, making the country increasingly dependent on Beijing – not just economically, but militarily as well.”
China is Cambodia’s largest bilateral donor, lender, investor, and trading partner, according to an ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute working paper published in March 2023.
China solidified its position as one of Cambodia’s key trading partners with a bilateral free trade agreement that took effect at the start of 2022. The pact removes tariffs on 90 per cent of Chinese exports to Cambodia and 97.53 per cent of Cambodian exports to China.
Over the past five years, Cambodia’s exports to China have grown at an annual rate of 10.2 per cent, rising from US$1 billion in 2017 to US$1.63 billion in 2022, according to government data.
China has also heavily invested in Cambodia’s infrastructure, including airports, roads, and private developments such as hotels and casinos.
Data firm Seasia Stats reports that Cambodia is the fourth-largest recipient of Chinese aid in Southeast Asia, receiving US$17.7 billion by 2024, behind Indonesia, Vietnam and Laos. This includes financial assistance, economic projects, and construction initiatives.
Analysts are divided on whether growing military ties between China and Cambodia will heighten tensions in the region. Some believe so – particularly with Vietnam, and to a lesser extent, Thailand.
Dr Abdul Rahman noted that Hanoi will be especially concerned that China is using Cambodia as a strategic lever to exert pressure on its southern border, especially given ongoing disputes in the South China Sea.
“Vietnamese officials view the development of air defence facilities at Ream as a serious security threat, especially if managed by China. Any air surveillance radar installed there could allow Chinese military personnel to track Vietnamese aircraft movements in southern Vietnam,” Dr Abdul Rahman explained.
“Coupled with the possibility of Chinese naval vessels operating from Ream, China could eventually pose a threat to Vietnam from both the north and south.”
Vietnam has remained largely reticent on China’s involvement in the revamp of Cambodia’s Ream naval base, with no official statements addressing the development directly.
Meanwhile, China has sought to downplay concerns over Ream. The state-run Global Times has published several opinion pieces dismissing Western reports about the base’s potential threats as “overhyped”. 
In a May 20 piece, the outlet called these reports “exaggerated sensationalism” and accused them of displaying “a fretful, even severely paranoid mentality”. 
The publication refuted claims of China seeking military influence through Cambodia, labelling them a “false narrative” and suggesting that such reports were part of a US strategy to “drive a wedge between China and ASEAN countries”.
A day before, the Associated Press reported that China’s ambassador to Cambodia Wang Wentian spoke in Sihanoukville, addressing the presence of two Chinese naval warships docked at Ream. 
Mr Wang emphasised that the Chinese navy brings “friendship and cooperation” wherever it sails. He added that the military cooperation between China and Cambodia enhances the security of both nations and the region.
Recent developments could also impact relations between Cambodia and Thailand, say observers.
Both governments have in recent years resumed long-stalled talks over their overlapping maritime claims in an energy-rich area in the Gulf of Thailand that dates back to the early 1970s.
Dr Abuza highlighted the potential impact of increased Chinese military presence in the Gulf of Thailand on Thailand, noting that Bangkok has developed closer ties with Beijing since the last military coup in 2014, acquiring significant amounts of Chinese weaponry over the past decade. 
China dislodged the US to become Thailand’s primary arms supplier in 2016. Between 2016 and 2022, Thailand received more arms in terms of value from China (US$394 million) than the United States (US$207 million), according to a Lowy Institute report published in December 2023.
“The Thais are quite surprised by China’s actions at Ream and have not received satisfactory answers from Beijing regarding its intentions,” Dr Abuza said. 
“As a result, they have begun reassessing their relationship with China, which has led to noticeable improvements in their alliance with the US over the past year.”
The Thai government has not issued any official statement regarding Cambodia’s Ream naval base, according to checks done by CNA on local and international news portals. However, in September 2022, Thailand’s National Security Council published an analysis in its newsletter, expressing concerns about the base.
The report highlighted growing apprehension that the facility could be used for “military purposes to bolster China’s naval power projection or potentially compete with Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor”.
It also urged Thai policymakers to reassess the implications of the base on the country’s maritime territories, the stability of the Gulf of Thailand, and Thailand’s relations with both China and the US.
Dr Chang from the Society for Strategic Studies has a different assessment. He does not think that increased Chinese military activity resulting from its use of the Ream naval base will hike regional tensions.
“The likelihood of Cambodia, as an ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member, permitting itself to be used as an overseas military base – contrary to its own constitution – and consequently becoming an accomplice to an aggressor, is virtually zero,” he asserted.
Dr Chang further noted that the two Type 056 corvettes being gifted by China to Cambodia possess moderate rather than overwhelming firepower.
“These vessels are expected to be primarily used for patrols beyond its shores, especially now that the Ream naval base has improved its communications and surveillance systems. They are certainly not intended for aggressive actions, so neighbouring states need not be overly concerned,” he added.
As a developing nation, Cambodia does not possess a large-scale military, making it normal and understandable for it to rely on a larger nation to enhance its military capabilities, noted Dr Chang, adding that this is where China has positioned itself as a valuable partner for the Southeast Asian nation.
“Given its two more powerful neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam, Cambodia must carefully balance its pursuit of military strength. It cannot appear too powerful, as that would raise concerns among its neighbours,” he explained.
Cambodia’s strengthening defence ties with China are partly driven by a decline in its relationship with the US, analysts say.
There have been visible cracks in bilateral ties across the years. In 2010, Washington imposed sanctions on Phnom Penh, including a suspension of military supplies, due to human rights abuse allegations. 
China was quick to fill the void – providing trucks and uniforms to the Cambodian military that same year and forging a deeper security partnership.
In 2017, Cambodia abruptly suspended joint military exercises with the US that were due to have been held for the eighth year in a row. At the time, a defence ministry spokesperson stated that the country was focused on preparing for local elections. However, the exercises have not been conducted since then.
More recently in 2021, Washington imposed an arms embargo on Cambodia, citing concerns about the growing influence of Chinese military presence in the country. Corruption and human rights abuses were also cited as reasons.
As the rivalry between the US and China intensifies in the region, Dr Abdul Rahman anticipates that the ongoing struggle for influence over states like Cambodia will persist.
“Small states situated between larger neighbours often seek support for their defence and security, much like Singapore did in its early years,” he noted.
“I anticipate that the international manoeuvring among superpowers and developing states will continue, particularly in the Southeast Asian region, where the dynamics are complex and deeply intertwined.”